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COMMENTS
THEORIES OF COMPUTER PROGRAM
PATENTABILITY
Jerome T. Taot
Much attention has been paid during the last twenty years to
the possibility of obtaining patent protection for computer pro-
grams. Part of this attention has been due to the recent explosion in
microprocessor and computer technology and the accompanying in-
crease in the importance of the methods by which such computers
are programmed.1
Part of the debate, however, results from conceptual difficulties
inherent in the unique nature of such programs. Computer pro-
grams have been said to "defy the conceptual molds provided by the
traditional patent and copyright systems." 2 A computer program
can be described as a process, as an apparatus, or as something in
between.
Some commentators see this difficulty as a reason to deny pat-
ent protection for all computer programs.3 These definitional
problems, however, should not be sufficient to provide a blanket
reason for denying such protection to novel, useful and nonobvious
computer programs which do not fall under any particular judicial
exception to the patent laws.
This article will discuss some of the various ways of defining a
computer "program," and the various ways in which each definition
may be pigeonholed into the patent system, and explore the patenta-
" B.S.E.E., Cornell University, J.D. candidate, George Washington National Law
Center. The author would like to thank Professor James Chandler for his invaluable
assistance.
1. See, eg., Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent Protection To Computer
Software.An EconomicAnalysis, 37 VAND. L. REv. 147, 148 nn.1 & 2 (1984).
2. Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection For Algorithms
and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1128-1129 (1990).
See also Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 405, 407
(1985) ("In [certain] respects... the program is unusual, if not unique").
3. Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 1023 (1986). Professor Newell's article is a response to Chisum, The Patentability of
Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 959 (1986).
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURN.L
bility problems raised by each definition. Before discussing the par-
ticularized issues involved in the patenting of computer programs, a
brief overview of the requirements for patent protection and the
basics of computer programming are provided.
I. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PATENT PROTECTION
The general patent statute is codified at 35 U.S.C. § 100 et seq.
A patent may be obtained on "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof... ."I The statute defines a patentable
"process" as a "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or
material." 5
Once an invention has been determined to fall within one of
these statutory classes of patentable subject matter, it must then
meet the requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.6 Ad-
ditionally, the patent application itself must adequately set forth
and describe the invention in terms such that other inventors can
make and use the invention described therein.7
If an invention is deemed by the patent examiner to satisfy all
of these requirements, a patent on the invention will be issued. The
patent grants to the inventor the right to foreclose others from mak-
ing, using or selling the patented invention for a nonrenewable term
of 17 years from the date of issue of the patent.' Upon expiration of
this statutory period, the subject matter of the patent passes into the
public domain and may be freely used in any way by any party.
Obtaining a patent on an invention is a long, complex process,
often spanning several years. The above discussion is necessarily
only a broad overview; the particular requirements are beyond the
scope of this article.
II. How A COMPUTER IS PROGRAMMED
Before exploring the definition of a computer "program," it is
convenient to examine how a computer is programmed.
Broadly speaking, a computer operates according to sets of in-
4. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1988). For a history of the statutory definitions, see Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181-84 (1981).
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988). These requirements will not be discussed in detail
here. For a more detailed discussion, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). These are known as the "enablement" requirements.
8. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
[Vol. 7
COMPUTER PROGR4M PATENTABILITY
structions designed by human operators to perform specific func-
tions or to solve particular problems. These instructions are of
three general types: those that direct the computer to receive speci-
fied data information (input instructions), those that direct the com-
puter to manipulate the received data in certain ways (logical or
operational instructions), and those that direct the computer to
send certain data information to "peripheral" devices (output in-
structions).9 These sets of input, operational and output instruc-
tions grouped together to direct the computer to perform a
particular task are commonly referred to collectively as a computer
"program." 1O
A program is thus a sequence of specific instructions, each of
which directs the computer to perform certain internal arithmetic
operations. These instructions can in turn be considered at two ba-
sic levels. The first is the low level "object code" which the com-
puter recognizes and actually utilizes in its internal operation.
Because modern computers operate internally according to binary
logic, "machine code" consists of combinations of Is and Os.11 In
actuality, these Is and Os are stored electronically within the com-
puter at discrete voltage levels (generally +5 volts for the "high"
bits or Is, and zero volts for the "low" bits or Os). The second is the
high-level "source code," which generally consists of instructions
written in one of many computer "languages." These languages
range in complexity, from very high-level languages whose instruc-
tions closely resemble the English language, to less high-level lan-
guages whose instructions are more technically precise and more
accurately reflect the actual logical operations involved.12 These
high-level languages are merely programming aids which enable a
human designer to conveniently map out the operations that he or
9. These "peripheral" devices can consist of conventional display units, data storage
devices, and the like; however, as defined here, they may also consist of any electromechani-
cal devices whose operation may be controlled by the computer, such as robotic arms, auto-
mated steel presses, etc. Hence, the term "output" signal is also intended to encompass what
are also known as "control" signals.
10. Programs can be further categorized; for example, see Note, supra note 1, at 153,
which categorizes computer programs as either "operating systems programs" or "applica-
tions programs." For this discussion, additional subclassifications such as these will all be
grouped together generally as merely different types of computer programs.
11. These combinations typaically occur in groups of eight digits or "bits," though mod-
em processors often accommodate longer bit combinations or "words."
12. Assembly language, which consists of abbreviated symbols and base-16 numerical
representations, is often considered a "mid"-level language because it is a fairly close repre-
sentation of object code. Assembly language instructions are directly translatable into
machine code on a one-to-one basis. For the purposes of this essay, however, and for ease of
discussion, anything which is not binary object code will be considered high-level.
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she wants the computer to perform. The computer cannot recog-
nize the language instructions as such; they must be converted into
object code for actual storage and execution. A high-level instruc-
tion may encompass several individual object code words.13 Both
high-level source code and low-level object code fall under the label
of computer "coding."
The actual code instructions selected to direct a computer to
perform a set of operations clearly cannot be the subject of a patent,
because this would in effect protect the language or the particular
instruction itself.14 What a programmer may be interested in pro-
tecting, however, is the particular sequential combination of lan-
guage instructions selected to perform a particular task.
Typically, however, different combinations of code instructions
may be utilized to perform precisely the same operation. Thus, pro-
tecting a particular combination of steps in a given computer lan-
guage would provide only limited protection. Broader protection
could be gained if one could patent the underlying logical process
which the particular language steps have been chosen to represent.
In the computer programming world, this logical process is com-
monly described on paper by a flowchart.1 5
III. THEORIES OF PATENTABILITY
The debate over patentability has principally concerned
whether a computer program, as such, falls within the definition of
a patentable "process" set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101. The
answer to this question, of course, depends upon which of the levels
discussed above one seeks to protect with a patent. There are three
possible ways of defining computer programs so that they may fall
within the patent laws. Each of them gives rise to distinct patenta-
bility problems.
A. Patenting a program as a process.
One may seek to patent a computer program as a process for
accomplishing what the computer program is designed to do.
13. The higher the language level, the less representative it is of the number of actual bit
sequences stored by the computer. See supra note 12.
14. Le., one could not patent the instruction "READ" or the code instruction
"01101011."
15. Commentators have identified other, more abstract levels at which the operations of
a computer may be analyzed. See, eg., Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7
W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 405, 409 (1985) (discussing additionally the "architecture" stage and
the "problem definition" stage). However, these additional levels tend to be less interesting
analytically for patentability purposes.
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Under this definition, each instruction step, or each group of related
instructions, is represented as a claimed process step. At this level,
protection is obtained essentially on the source or object code se-
quence used to implement the program. 16
The protection obtained under this theory is rather limited. A
patent holder would only be able to foreclose others from using a
particular instruction sequence or its equivalent (i.e., the same se-
quence of steps written in a different computer language). 17 Be-
cause of the limited scope of protection, this theory raises few
analytical problems.
B. Patenting a program as the underlying "art."
Alternatively, a computer program may be patented as the
functional embodiment of the underlying "art." That is, the patent
owner seeks to protect the logical or theoretical process which the
particular code steps are intended to embody in functional form.
This underlying process has been called the "computer program al-
gorithm,"' 8 and that terminology will be adopted here.
Conceptually, there are several important things to note about
granting patent protection for this type of logical process. At this
level, it is irrelevant which programming language is used to imple-
ment the logical process; any code combination which implements
the protected logical process infringes on a patent for the process. 19
Patenting this underlying process would thus prevent others from
avoiding infringement merely by changing individual instruction
steps, or by substituting groups of instructions that perform the
same function using different individual code steps.20 However, this
16. This type of protection is somewhat analogous to the scope of protection obtained
through the copyright laws. That is, under both schemes of protection, it is the object code
that is protected. See Note, Copyright Protection Of Computer Program Object Code, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1722 (1983).
17. See id. at 1733-39. See also Note, The Patentability of Computer Programs: Merrill
-Lynch's Patent For a Financial Services System, 59 IND. L.J. 633, 637 (1985).
18. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1026 n.2; Note, The Disclosure Requirements of 35
US.C. § 112 and Software-Related Patent Applications Debugging the System, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 855 n.1 (1986).
19. Note, supra note 17, at 637:
[While a competitor cannot use one's copyrighted program without permis-
sion, there is no prohibition [in copyright law] against devising a different pro-
gram to perform the same functions. Patents are sought in order to provide
[this additional] protection for the underlying idea....
20. See, e.g., Anthony, Jr. & Colwell, Litigating The Validity and Infringement of
Software Patents, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1307 (1984).
A patent on a computer program need not be limited to the manner of expres-
sion used by the programmer. Rather, the patent may protect the broad con-
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level of protection raises a host of patentability problems.
1. The Mathematical Algorithm exception.
It has been argued that computer program algorithms are un-
patentable because they are merely abstract mathematical algo-
rithms.2" This assertion, however, cuts too broadly. While
computer program algorithms which are merely mathematical algo-
rithms should not be protected by the patent laws, it is not the case
that all such computer program algorithms are by definition mathe-
matical algorithms as well.
Commentators and courts have struggled to find a principled
basis for distinguishing "computer program algorithms" from
"mathematical algorithms. ' 22
The Supreme Court has long held that laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas are excluded from patent protec-
tion.23 For example, the Court has stated "a new mineral discov-
ered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable
subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated
law E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.
Such discoveries are 'manifestations of ... nature, free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none.' "24
In the early 1970s, the Court included among these "long es-
tablished principles" patents which sought to protect mathematical
formulae. Interestingly, the inventions in these cases, and those
which followed, utilized digital computers as elements of the inven-
tion.25 However, the courts avoided rejecting the claims at issue
cepts or ideas embodied in the program. Patent protection is typically
expressed in broad terms which describe the overall organization or function of
a computer program.
Id at 1307-1308 (footnote omitted).
21. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1123-25.
22. See, eg., Note, supra note 1, at 156 ("confusion about the meaning of the term
'algorithm' has been a major reason why the Supreme Court has refused to extend patent
protection to software programs"); Note, supra note 17, at 633 ("[l]ower courts and patent
practitioners are now struggling to determine how these cases fit into the general theory of
patent law"); Note, The Status of Patent Law Concerning Computer Programs: The Proper
Form For Legal Protection, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 155, 158-59 (1984), and sources cited therein;
Comment, Softright: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of Users' and Producers' Rights in
Computer Software, 44 LA. L. REV. 1413 (1984) ("[t]he flurry of literature and complaints
from all sides indicate that there is a serious problem and that there is widespread dissatisfac-
tion with the current state of the law").
23. See, eg., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
67 (1972); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Rubber-Tip
Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
24. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
25. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972), involved a method of converting
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based on the use of such computers, directing their objections in-
stead to perceived mathematical algorithms which underlay the in-
vention. For example, in Gottschalk v. Benson,26 the Supreme
Court found that claims directed to an algorithm used to convert
binary code decimal numbers to equivalent pure binary numbers
fall outside of the scope of § 101. The court defined "algorithm" as
a "procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem"
and concluded that such an algorithm is like a law of nature and is,
therefore, nonstatutory.
Similarly, the claims at issue in Parker v. Flook 27 provided for
a method for programming a digital computer with a mathematical
control equation to update alarm limits during the catalytic chemi-
cal conversion of hydrocarbons.2" The Supreme Court found the
claims nonstatutory, characterizing the invention as seeking to pro-
tect a formula for computing an "alarm limit" from other known
variables, without offering any new methods for selecting the vari-
ables to be used.29
In these cases, the Supreme Court, and the C.C.P.A. in subse-
quent cases, avoided framing the computer as the central element
on which the question of patentability turned." Thus, otherwise
statutory subject matter is not rendered unpatentable merely be-
cause it contains an algorithm or recites a step to be performed by a
computer. In Benson, the Court specifically stated that its holding
did not preclude the granting of a patent "for any program serv-
icing a computer."31 In Flook, the Court stated that "a process is
not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of nature or a
mathematical algorithm."32 The Court addressed this issue directly
in Diamond v. Diehr.33 There, the Court held that a process of cur-
ing synthetic rubber which included a step of constantly recalcu-
lating in a digital computer the appropriate cure time according to a
coded numbers to a system more easily understood by digital computers. Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978), concerned a method for programming a digital computer to update
alarm limits during a hydrocarbon conversion process. See infra text accompanying notes
27-29.
26. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
28. Id. at 586.
29. 437 U.S. at 591-92.
30. For example, the Court stated in Benson: "It is said that the decision precludes a
patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold." 409 U.S. at 71.
31. Id.
32. 437 U.S. at 590.
33. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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well-known mathematical equation, did fall within the scope of pat-
entable subject matter defined in § 101.
[R]espondents here do not seek to patent a mathematical
formula. Instead, they seek patent protection for a process of
curing synthetic rubber. Their process admittedly employs a
well-known mathematical equation, but they do not seek to pre-
empt the use of that equation. Rather, they seek only to fore-
close from others the use of that equation in conjunction with all
of the other steps in their claimed process.3 4
a The C. C.P.A. s two-step test of patentability.
In the period following Benson and Flook, the C.C.P.A. devel-
oped a working test to implement the Supreme Court's broad com-
mands. The court limited the scope of Benson and Flook to claims
principally or exclusively directed to mathematical algorithms as
defined in Benson. In In re Freeman,35 In re Walter,36 and later, In
re Abele,37 the C.C.P.A. developed a two-pronged test to determine
whether such claims fell within the definition of statutory subject
matter. Under this test, a claim must be analyzed as a whole to
determine 1) whether it recites, directly or indirectly, a mathemati-
cal algorithm;38 and, if it does, 2) whether the algorithm is applied
in any manner to physical elements or process steps. 39 An inven-
tion satisfies the requirements of § 101 either if it fails the first test,
or if it satisfies both. That is, a claim that does not recite a mathe-
matical algorithm falls within the scope of § 101, as does a claim in
which a mathematical algorithm is somehow applied to physical el-
ements or process steps.
The Supreme Court implicitly affirmed this two-part test in the
case of Diamond v. Diehr. ° Building upon the analysis of Diehr,
the C.C.P.A. in Abele analyzed the second prong of the Freeman-
Walter test as inquiring whether the claims, when viewed without
the algorithm, contained otherwise statutory subject matter.41
34. Id. at 187.
35. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
36. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
37. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
38. Id. at 905.
39. Id. at 908-09. See also Walter, 618 F.2d at 767.
40. The Court stated, "We recognize, of course, that when a claim recites a mathenati-
cal formula... an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seeking patent protection
for that formula in the abstract." 450 U.S. at 191. The Court goes on to say that "when a
claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a [patenta-
ble] structure or process... then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101." Id. at 192.
41. 684 F.2d at 909.
[Vol. 7
COMPUTER PROGRAM PA4TENTABILITY
Thus, for the C.C.P.A., a computer program algorithm may be
patentable, unless it would result directly or indirectly in the patent-
ing of a mathematical algorithm, law of nature, or other otherwise
unpatentable subject matter.
The mathematical/nonmathematical distinction has been criti-
cized.42 Much of the criticism and confusion arises from the
Supreme Court's tautological definition of the terms "mathemati-
cal" and "algorithm." The Court in Benson defined what it called a
"mathematical algorithm" as "a procedure for solving a given type
of mathematical problem."'43 Of course, this definition merely begs
the question of what is meant by "mathematical."
At some level, all computer programs are "mathematical" in-
sofar as a computer operates internally by performing binary arith-
metic operations. The C.C.P.A. has repeatedly avoided
approaching the problem at this level, however. "This statement
... would suffice to remove all computer-arts inventions from the
scope of § 101. It is itself misleading because it ignores what the
computer is doing, concentrating instead on how it is being done.""
Thus, while every computer process is in some sense a "mathemati-
cal" algorithm, not all such programs are thereby rendered nonstat-
utory under the Benson exception to § 101.
The Supreme Court's definition has been criticized on another
level. Professors Newell 5 and Samuelson46 assert that all algo-
rithms are "mathematical" as that term is defined by mathemati-
cians. "Computer scientists ... understand 'mathematics' to be a
field concerned with defining abstract relationships among concepts
and with defining rules about how those concepts should be
manipulated."'47 Professor Newell puts it even more broadly:
"Humans think by means of algorithms. Sequences of mental steps
and algorithms are the same thing. . . ."' Professor Samuelson
asserts that patents at the computer program algorithm level could
be infringed by thinking through its steps or by practicing it in eve-
42. See, eg., Chisum, supra note 3, at 977-78; Newell, supra note 3, at 1024; Samuelson,
supra note 2, at nn.296-345 and accompanying text.
43. 409 U.S. at 65.
44. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 769
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 812 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd by
an equally divided Court, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
45. See Newell, supra note 3, at 1024.
46. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1123.
47. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1123.
48. Newell, supra note 3, at 1024-25. See also Note, supra note 1, at 172-73 ("[p]roblem
solvers have not confined their use of algorithms to mathematical contexts").
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ryday life.49
The problem with this criticism is that it is overly broad. That
the subject matter of a computer program patent parallels the
human thought process, does not necessarily render it unpatentable;
all process patents that result from human invention bear the marks
of the human thought process in that an inventor at some point
envisioned the steps of the process in his or her mind. 0 Broadly
speaking, any process, such as a chemical process, can be modelled
as an algorithm plus its physical components. 51 Thus, a process
patent for such a chemical process covers not only the particular
physical combinations of chemicals, but also the underlying al-
gorithm for combining them;52 nonetheless, such processes are not
thereby rendered nonstatutory.
For Professor Samuelson, the patentable difference lies in the
"instantiation" of the underlying algorithm. "Instantiation" is de-
fined as the embodiment of the inventive concept.5 3 She presents an
analogy: algorithms for making steel have their primary instantia-
tion in the processing of raw materials in a steel plant, and is thus
statutory, while in contrast, a computer program algorithm has its
primary instantiation in computer programs written to implement
them.54 "Patentability has traditionally been judged by the nature
of the primary instantiation anticipated by the procedure.... Math-
ematics has traditionally been considered part of the 'liberal
arts.' , Coupled with her assertion that "all algorithms are math-
ematical," she then concludes that all computer program algo-
rithms are thereby nonstatutory.
It is not clear, however, that Professor Samuelson's analogy is
precisely correct. One could just as easily describe a computer pro-
gram algorithm as having its primary instantiation in a computer
that has been loaded with a program, or in a digital system that has
been permanently designed to execute the algorithm (i.e., one in
which the machine code is embodied in a ROM or other permanent
storage device).56 In the same manner that the underlying al-
49. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1124.
50. Disregarding, of course, those inventions which result from serendipitous
discoveries.
51. Le., it can be described by a flowchart.
52. Indeed, the protection would be quite limited if it only covered the physical ele-
ments of the process.
53. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1112 n.341.
54. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1112.
55. Id.
56. In this case, it would not be precisely correct to say that the algorithm, or even the
machine code, is "stored" as such in the computer. In actuality, a computer memory is a
300 [Vol. 7
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gorithm for a process of making steel is "instantiated" in a particu-
lar industrial context, a computer program algorithm is designed
for a particular purpose and is tied into a physical computer system
(which can be quite elaborate depending upon the complexity of the
program). The computer program receives input from electrical or
mechanical input devices, manipulates electromagnetic signals, and
perhaps operating attached magnetic storage media, display de-
vices, etc. Neither the steel-making algorithm nor the computer
program algorithm could be infringed just by thinking about it; the
claims describing both processes can only be infringed by using the
algorithms within their associated physical contexts.
The C.C.P.A. has defined the term "mathematical algorithm"
narrowly. That is, the first prong of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test
is satisfied if the process steps perform the function of carrying out a
mathematical equation, i.e., if the steps operate arithmetically on
numerical values to obtain other numerical values as an end prod-
uct. In In re Bradley, affirmed by an equally divided Supreme
Court,57 the C.C.P.A. stated
[i]t is true that a modem digital computer manipulates data, usu-
ally in binary form, by performing mathematical operations....
But this is only how the computer does what it does. Of impor-
tance is the significance of the data and their manipulation in the
real world, i.e., what the computer is doing. It may represent the
solution of the Pythagorean theorem, or a complex vector equa-
tion describing the behavior of a rocket in flight, in which case
the computer is performing a mathematical algorithm and solv-
ing an equation. This is what is involved in Benson and Flook.
On the other hand, it may be that the data and the manipulations
performed thereon by the computer, when viewed on a human
level, represent the contents of a page of the Milwaukee tele-
phone directory, or the text of a court opinion retrieved by a
computerized law service. Such information is utterly devoid of
mathematical significance.58
The conflict between these two viewpoints is basically a differ-
ence in perspective. One position approaches the problem from a
theoretical position, taking the view that all algorithms, broadly de-
physical array of digital switches that bears no resemblance to a sequence of process steps
that we commonly call a program. See discussion infra at notes 95-109 and accompanying
text.
57. 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided Court, Diamond v. Brad-
ley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
58. Id. at 812.
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fined, are mathematical.5 9 The C.C.P.A., on the other hand,
grounds its view firmly in the "real world" in which the term
"mathematical" is defined "on a human level."'
Of the two viewpoints, surely the C.C.P.A.'s is the more pref-
erable approach. Though it may be the less intellectually correct
position, it does have the virtue of recognizing that inventors live
and function in a world where fine analytic distinctions are often
more confusing than necessary. Popular perception surely has a
place in the patent laws.61 Even though the patent laws seek to
encourage inventive activity, an inventor may discover that his or
her invention cannot be patented. One who has composed a novel
and useful computer program will find little solace in the fact that
Ren6 Descartes was able to abstract Euclid's theorems to represen-
tations,62 or that those of greater than "ordinary skill in the art"
deem it unpatentable. The "popular perception" model is particu-
larly preferable when we consider that the determination of patent
validity will ultimately be entrusted to politically appointed judges
and juries who are unlikely to grasp fine mathematical
distinctions.63
There may be situations where a computer program is in effect
equivalent to a mathematical algorithm, as where the program is
designed merely to execute a particular equation. In that case, the
program would be nonstatutory. However, generally speaking, a
computer program is not per se a "mathematical algorithm" simply
because it is a computer program. This is so even if the program
incorporates in its logic sections or subroutines which execute
mathematical equations." Claims directed to a computer program
should be presumptively viewed as containing otherwise statutory
59. Professor Samuelson concedes that her definition runs counter to "popular percep-
tion." Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1123.
60. Bradley, 600 F.2d at 812.
61. For example, 35 U.S.C. § 103 codifies the standard of obviousness as that of a per-
son of "ordinary" skill in the art, a term which can be roughly analogized to the ubiquitous
"reasonable man" standard in negligence cases. Panduit Corp v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810
F.2d 1561, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. den., 481 U.S. 1052 (1987) ("person having ordinary
skill... not unlike the reasonable man"). Both tests measure the conduct at issue against
popular expectations of propriety in a particular situation.
62. See Samuelson, supra note 2 at 1123 n.390.
63. This may also be construed as an argument in favor of removing computer pro-
grams altogether from the scope of the patent laws. The ultimate question here, however, is
where to draw the line - at a theoretical point, or at a point defined by "popular percep-
tion." This author merely asserts that the latter is preferable to the former.
64. In that case, the second prong of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test would be impli-
cated. See discussion infra at notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
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subject matter unless they fall within another judicial exception to
§ 101.
Defining the term "mathematical algorithm" in this way, and
thereby limiting the scope of the judicial exception, is analytically
sound.65 A computer program which merely rephrases an abstract
mathematical formula or equation in computer code is nothing
more than the equation itself, phrased a different way, and should
not be patentable. On the other hand, defining the terms broadly,
as Professors Newell and Samuelson would define them, would run
counter to the Supreme Court's express disclaimer that its decision
was not intended to preclude the patenting of any program serv-
icing a computer.
66
b. The second prong of the C. C.P.A. s test.
The C.C.P.A. has also adopted this liberal approach in its in-
terpretation of the second prong of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test.
Under this test, a claim which has been found to recite a mathemat-
ical algorithm is nevertheless statutory if the algorithm is applied in
any manner to physical elements or process steps. 67 Essentially, the
test inquires whether a mathematical algorithm or formula is the
principal or exclusive subject matter of the claim, or whether the
claim merely utilizes the equation in a particular context. 8
The Supreme Court painted with a broad brush in the rationale
of the rejection of the claims in Diehr: "The sole practical applica-
tion of the algorithm was in connection with the programming of a
general purpose digital computer." 69  It further stated that
"[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or
thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not
include particular machines."' 7° Taken in isolation, these state-
ments may be understood as precluding the patenting of precisely
the sort of computer programs discussed above, programs designed
for use in a computer which stands alone and which is not part of a
larger process. This section will explore the implications of the
65. The policy reasons in support of this interpretation are discussed infra at note 94
and accompanying text.
66. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
67. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
68. Abele, 684 F.2d at 906 (subject matter of claim not patentable "if it would wholly
preempt an algorithm... or if it would preempt the algorithm but for limiting its use to a
particular technological environment").
69. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185-86.
70. Id. at 184.
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"transformation" requirement of Diehr on the patentability of com-
puter programs as such.
Processes which do involve the transformation of a physical
thing into a different state or thing are traditionally protectable by
patents. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court stated, with refer-
ence to the Patent Act of 1793,
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to pro-
duce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed
upon the subject matter to be transformed and reduced to a dif-
ferent state or thing. If new and useful, it is just as patentable as
a piece of machinery. In the language of the patent law, it is an
art. The machinery pointed out as suitable to perform the pro-
cess may or may not be new or patentable; whilst the process
itself may be altogether new, and produce an entirely new result.
The process requires that certain things should be done with cer-
tain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in
doing this may be of secondary consequence.
71
The computer in Diehr was merely one element in an industrial
process for curing synthetic rubber which clearly transformed a
physical thing into something different. The Court took pains to
describe the process as one which was otherwise protectable under
the patent laws.72 In fact, the Court took the peculiar position of
viewing the mathematical algorithm and computer as potential bars
to the patenting of an otherwise statutory invention (a position also
taken in Benson and Flook).73
In Flook, the Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether the
identification of a limited category of useful, though conventional,
post-solution applications of such a formula makes respondent's
method eligible for patent protection," and answered that question
in the negative.74 Similarly, the Court cautioned in Diehr that "in-
significant post-solution activity will not transform an unpatentable
principle into a patentable process," but held the activity there to be
statutory.75 Thus, novel or significant post-solution activity may
well make such a claim patentable, at least where such activity
serves to satisfy the second prong of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test.
Where the inventor's contribution to the art lies in a novel logi-
cal process or flowchart, it is difficult to see why patent protection
71. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-788 (1877).
72. See, ag., Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184, 187.
73. See id Professor Samuelson points this out in her very thorough discussion of
Diehr. Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1094-99.
74. 437 U.S. at 585.
75. 450 U.S. at 191-92.
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should turn on whether the process is tied to a particular mechani-
cal process. An abstract logical sequence which is unattached to a
particular application may be unpatentable as a purely "mental pro-
cess."76 For example, an applicant should not be able to patent the
process of sorting any set of numbers, or to patent the idea of a
nested loop. On the other hand, many programs are by their nature
restricted to particular applications or contexts. It is true that pro-
grams linked with particular mechanical or industrial processes are
task-specific; however, programs designed for specific purposes,
such as defining a particular word processing program, or a particu-
lar video game, are often equally so. Protection of these programs
in and of themselves will not remove basic ideas from the public
domain nor unduly preempt implementations designed for other ap-
plications. Though it is not always easy to categorize a particular
program as either "abstract" or application-specific - indeed, these
two definitions merely define the ends of a spectrum, rather than
two pigeonholes - requiring a "physical transformation" or "post-
solution activity" is particularly inappropriate as a defining test.
The artificiality of this test is easily demonstrated. For exam-
ple, suppose two inventors design identical computer programs for
use in known industrial processes. Inventor A discloses that the
program is to be used in the particular industrial process, but claims
only the program logic. Inventor B, on the other hand, explicitly
claims the logic plus the known steps of the industrial process. If a
"transformation" or other "post-solution activity" were required
for a computer program to be patentable, Inventor B would be enti-
tled to a patent, but Inventor A would not be entitled to a patent for
developing the identical program." This would be true even if the
other steps of the industrial process belonged to the public domain
and B could not obtain a patent on the process without the pro-
gram. It would also be true if Inventor A's program were clearly
inapplicable to any context except the process in question (and
hence the argument that his program would preempt other uses
fails). The distinction in this case would seem to be more artificial
than anything else - B's invention is patentable over A's simply
because well-known physical steps were explicitly included in the
claims, even though those steps were implicitly equally necessary to
A's invention.
Or take a second example. Inventor A has designed a novel
76. See discussion infra at notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
77. Of course, we will for this essay ignore the issues of interferences, infringement, and
double-patenting.
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word processing program, which can be loaded into a home com-
puter. He claims the logic of the program as his invention. Inven-
tor B designs an electronic word processing terminal (which
operates identically to A's invention), and claims the terminal and
digital circuitry as his invention. A general purpose computer,
when loaded with A's program, is physically identical to the digital
configuration of B's digital circuitry, 7 but only temporarily so.
Under this reasoning, Inventor B would be entitled to the patent,
but Inventor A would not be, even though their inventive acts were
identical.
The courts seem to have recognized the artificiality of this dis-
tinction, and have responded by liberally interpreting the definition
of "transformation" and "physical" state or thing. For example, in
Freeman, the C.C.P.A. dodged the question entirely. In addressing
the Patent and Trademark Office's (PTO) contention that providing
a "fleeting display on a cathode ray tube" as the solution to the
algorithm was insufficient post-solution activity under Flook, the
court stated that since there was no mathematical algorithm in-
volved in the invention, as there was in Flook, there was no question
of "post-solution activity" in that case.79 Though the court side-
stepped the issue, this statement, or more precisely, what the court
did not say, has potentially broad implications. It is apparent from
this decision that a "pure" computer program which operates on
input data and whose only end result is a display on a cathode ray
tube (CRT), is not per se nonstatutory under Benson and Flook.
In In re Johnson,"0 In re Sherwood,"1 and In re Taner,2 the
C.C.P.A. addressed a trilogy of applications directed to seismic de-
tection through wave propagation. Johnson was directed to a
method for removing unwanted noise components from seismic
wave data to form noise-free seismic traces.8 3 Sherwood was di-
rected to converting amplitude-versus-time seismic traces into am-
plitude-versus-depth seismic traces.8 4 Taner claimed a method of
simulating substantially planar or substantially cylindrical seismic
78. See, ag., In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969) ("if a machine is
programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine
without that program; its memory elements are differently arranged"). See also discussion
infra at notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
79. 573 F.2d at 1246.
80. 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
81. 613 F.2d 809 (C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. den., 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
82. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
83. 589 F.2d at 1070.
84. 613 F.2d at 811.
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energy waves from substantially spherical seismic waves."5 In all
three, sequences of electrical signals were formed from reflected en-
ergy waves to produce different sequences of electrical signals.
Though the court stated that all three methods claimed mathemati-
cal algorithms, and thus satisfied the first prong of Freeman-Walter-
Abele, it also found that all three inventions satisfied the second
prong, and thus were statutory. "[T]he claims were, as a whole,
drawn not to a method of solving that algorithm but to a process of
converting one physical thing into another physical thing." 6 "Seis-
mic traces are ... physical apparitions." 7 "That those 'physical
apparitions' may be expressed in mathematical terms is in our view
irrelevant."' 8
Thus, speaking in the context of mathematical algorithms, the
C.C.P.A. has broadly defined the "transformation" requirement to
include the manipulation of electrical signals. 89 It would seem,
then, that implementing a computer program algorithm in a digital
computer would satisfy this requirement. After all, the acts of re-
ceiving electronic data signals, internally manipulating them into
other signals, and outputting new signals, are precisely what a com-
puter does.
2. The Mental Steps exception to § 101.
Closely related to the mathematical algorithm exception is the
doctrine that mental steps cannot be patented as such. Indeed,
these two doctrines derive from the same policy that abstract ideas
are not patentable.90
The Mental Steps doctrine is particularly important in the con-
text of computer program patentability. At some level, all pro-
grams are "mental steps" in that they represent a logical process.
This is, however, no reason to deny patent protection to all such
programs as a fixed rule.
85. 681 F.2d at 787.
86. Id at 790.
87. Sherwood, 613 F.2d at 813.
88. Taner, 681 F.2d at 790.
89. The C.C.P.A. dispensed with this requirement entirely in such cases as In re Toma,
575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A 1978), In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977), In re Musgrave,
431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970), In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). In those
cases, the claims were held statutory even though the processes in question arguably would
not have been statutory but for the fact that they were performed by a computer.
90. The PTO has implemented this policy in its requirement that to be patentable, an
idea must be reduced to practice, not merely conceived.
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The MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 9 ' at
§ 2106 sets out an illustrative example of a bare set of source or
object code instructions. The illustration there seeks to protect a set
of instructions for comparing two arrays to generate a third array.
The MPEP states that the set of instructions is probably not pro-
tectable "when not associated with a computing machine to accom-
plish a specific purpose", because it represents a mere idea or
abstract intellectual concept of a programmer.92 This is a correct
conclusion. Where the computer program algorithm is nothing
more than a description of an abstract process written in computer
code, it is nonstatutory. Not all computer program algorithms,
however, are necessarily abstract. Further, a computer program al-
gorithm may well implement an abstract idea as one step or element
(for example by utilizing the MPEP's example code in a subroutine
in a larger program), and nonetheless be statutory subject matter.
To use a different example, one cannot patent the idea of a
nested loop, because it is a mere abstraction. Though the
C.C.P.A.'s two-part test is not directly applicable to this situation
because no mathematical algorithm is implicated, the rationale for
the second prong of the test applies equally in this context. The
idea of a nested loop, like a mathematical equation, is not patenta-
ble in itself; it is only patentable when applied in a particular
context.
The Supreme Court recognized this distinction when it stated
that "it is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature
or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well
be deserving of patent protection. ' 93 Thus, a computer program
91. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2106
(5th ed. 6th rev. 1987) [hereinafter MPEP].
92. Id at 2100-4. The example given is as follows:
"consider the following claim[ ]:
(2) 'A computer program for comparing an array A(N) with array B(M)
to generate array C comprising the steps of:
Do 70 N=1, 10
Do 80 M=l,20
If A(N) = B(N) then C(M) = B(M)
80 Continue
70 Continue * * *'"
The MPEP then asserts that "[tihis bare set of instructions fails to recite subject matter that
falls within any statutory category. In this regard, a bare set of computer instructions does
not set forth a sequence of steps which could be viewed as a statutory process. Such a com-
puter language listing of instructions, when not associated with a computing machine to ac-
complish a specific purpose, would not constitute a machine implemented process, but would
constitute nonstatutory subject matter as the mere idea or abstract intellectual concept of a
programmer, or as a collection of printed matter." Id.
93. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (emphasis in original). See also Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v.
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which implements a mental idea in a larger context may be patenta-
ble as the application of an underlying algorithm or idea to a spe-
cific context. Of course, a program algorithm which is nothing
more than the computer code version of an otherwise unpatentable
abstract idea does not thereby become statutory merely because it is
implemented on a computer. 94 In that situation, the mental idea
could not be said to have been applied in any manner to a process.
For example, though the nested loop described in the MPEP
may not be patentable in itself, the code or flowchart implementing
a particular program, such as a word processing program, which
includes such a loop could be considered patentable as an applica-
tion of the formula to a particular process. In this example, the
known structure or process would be the particular computer sys-
tem in which the program is stored and executed. The computer
would be a known structure applied to a particular purpose - for
example, as a word processor or video game console.
3. Policy justifications.
The crux of an unpatentable mental idea or mathematical al-
gorithm is that it is unlimited in application, and yet cannot be ap-
plied to any utilitarian function on its own. Thus, the law of gravity
broadly describes a physical phenomenon that may be applied to
many different contexts, from ballistic missiles to golf club designs,
and yet one cannot "use" the principle as such. One can only create
an invention, perhaps patentable, that takes advantage of the mani-
festation of the principle in a particular way. The principle itself
can be applied in different contexts to create diverse inventions. In
contrast, a patentable invention is an application of such a principle,
useable in and of itself (possibly with the aid of other known inven-
tions or applications) for the specific utilitarian purpose for which it
was designed.
Described this way, it is clear that a computer program al-
gorithm is more than just a mental idea or law of nature. Such
program algorithms are designed for particular utilitarian purposes.
A program drafted as a video game cannot normally be applied to a
different computer to form a word processing program. It can,
Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939), reh'g den., 306 U.S. 608 (1939) ('[w]hile a
scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be").
94. As the C.C.P.A. stated, "Claims to nonstatutory processes do not automatically
and invariably become patentable upon incorporation of reference to apparatus." In re de
Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1244 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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however, be used in and of itself with the aid of a known digital
computer system.
It is important to note that defining a "program" as the under-
lying logical process conforms fully with the fundamental purposes
of the patent laws, that disclosure and patenting of an invention
should add to, and not detract from, the store of knowledge in the
public domain. The rationale for granting protection for applica-
tions of ideas is simply that by disclosing to the public a novel, use-
ful and nonobvious application of a principle otherwise "free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none,"' 95 an inventor has advanced
the useful or technological arts for the benefit of society, and is re-
warded with a patent grant. This rationale applies equally to com-
puter programs. A nested loop is unpatentable; however, novel,
useful and nonobvious applications or implementations of such a
loop contribute to the public store of knowledge.
At this definitional level, a "program" is necessarily limited in
its context and utility, so that patent protection would not preempt
abstract ideas or laws of nature otherwise available to all. A "pro-
gram" under this definition is a specific logical sequence designed
for implementation o n a particular computer system to achieve par-
ticular purposes (such as executing a word processing program or a
video game on an IBM-PC-compatible system). Granting such pro-
tection would not preempt the adaptation of similar logic, or even
the copying of portions of the patented code, for different purposes.
Nor would such protection preclude the use of dissimilar methods
to perform the same purpose. In fact, such programs are often
much more limited in scope and application than are analogous
mechanical or industrial processes. This is particularly true given
the vastly different types of computer systems currently in use. For
example, a program sequence designed to prioritize multiple re-
quests in a sixty-four bit multiprogram environment would be com-
pletely inapplicable to most eight-bit personal computer systems.
C. Patenting a program as a machine part.
A third possible approach under which a computer program
may be patentable lies in considering a computer program, when
stored in a computer's memory, as a physical part of a machine.
Under this view, a computer program may be patented as a physical
apparatus, rather than as a process.
It is important to note that technologically, though an al-
95. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
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gorithm may be a logical sequence of steps, it is not stored as such
in a computer memory. Rather, when loaded with a program, a
computer memory is a spatial array of digital elements (electromag-
netic signals) which operate electronically. Because a single step of
source code may represent several steps of machine code, and thus
many individual digital operations, a computer does not necessarily
execute an algorithm in a fashion which parallels the appearance of
the flowchart or code on paper.96 Programs which appear nearly
identical at even the object code level may bear little resemblance to
each other when their respective arrangements in memory are
compared.
The C.C.P.A. recognized this distinction early on, when it
stated that "if a machine is programmed in a certain new and unob-
vious way, it is physically different from the machine without that
program; its memory elements are differently arranged."9 7 Because
a computer stores program commands as binary elements, this pro-
tection would seem to be necessarily limited to the protection of
particular object code as it is stored in a particularly configured
computer. 98
The C.C.P.A. held inBradley that a so-called "firmware" mod-
ule, hardware elements permanently programmed with a
microcode, is statutory within § 101.11 The court stated that
[A]ppellants have characterized their combination of hardware
elements as a mechanism which enables the computer to alter
information in its system base.... They are in no way claiming
the altered information; in fact, the particular information acted
upon by appellants' invention is irrelevant to the operation of the
invention itself.'0°
This is undoubtedly a correct result. 1 ' Such single-purpose
computers - digital circuitry which has been permanently con-
figured to perform a certain process, such as an electronic calcula-
tor, the chip in a digital watch, or a Texas Instruments "Speak &
96. See, eg., Von Spakovsky, Von Spakovsky & Graffeo, The Limited Patenting of
Computer Programs: A Proposed Statutory Approach, 16 CUMB. L. REv. 27, 38-39 (1985)
(discussing the relationship between source and object code).
97. In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
98. Different computers have different memory storage and addressing techniques;
hence, this protection would, if narrowly defined, seem limited to particular computer
systems.
99. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd by an equally divided Court,
Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
100. Id. at 812-13.
101. For a different view, see Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1047 & n.91 and at 1123 &
nn.389-394.
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Spell" - have long been considered statutory subject matter under
§ 101 independently of the data which the devices are designed to
manipulate. Indeed, an electronic calculator is simply the solid-
state electronic equivalent of a conventional adding machine. On
this point, the C.C.P.A.'s language in Bradley is revealing:
We see no difference... with respect to being within § 101, be-
tween appellants' claimed invention and a strictly mechanical ad-
ding machine, which is certainly statutory if claimed in a manner
which does not embrace any particular calculation that the
machine is capable of making.10 2
Thus, speaking broadly, computer "hardware" that has been con-
figured for a particular purpose is clearly patentable.
The Bradley court expressly cautioned that "[i]f appellants
were claiming the information embodied in the firmware or the
firmware itself, per se, a different case would be presented. We ex-
press no opinion on the statutory nature of such an inven-
tion. .. ,10 The court emphasized several times that it addressed
only the "combination of hardware elements, one of which happens
to be... microprogrammed in a particular manner.""
In so limiting its decision, the C.C.P.A. left open the question
of whether a general purpose computer programmed in a particular
way could be patented as a sort of "temporary" firmware. That is, a
general purpose computer, when programmed in a particular fash-
ion, could be thought of as a single-purpose computer (like a digital
calculator), at least as long as it is so programmed. The computer
program on which protection is actually sought would then be
analogous to the microcode used to program the Bradley firmware
module.
Protecting the program in this manner would remove many of
the patentability problems that arise when trying to patent the logi-
cal sequence underlying the program. However, other analytical
questions would be raised.
1. Scope of protection.
The first question would be the scope of protection actually
obtained under this method. As briefly described above,'05 because
of the differences in the ways computers utilize their memory ad-
dresses, this form of protection would be limited to the protection of
102. Bradley, 600 F.2d at 812.
103. Id. at 813.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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object code within a particular computer system. This may well be
sufficient; in reality, most prepackaged computer programs sold
commercially are indeed object code packages tailored for specific
computer systems.
2. Enablement problems.
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent application "shall con-
tain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains
... to make and use the same...." 1 6 This so-called "enablement"
requirement may be satisfied by claiming a particular product or
substance as the result obtained by carrying out a specified pro-
cess."0 7 When framed as a product-by-process claim, the patented
invention is still the resulting product itself. That is, the making,
using or selling of that product would infringe the patent even
where a different process is used to produce it.
An interesting conceptual question is whether the protection
obtained could be expanded by claiming the programmed computer
hardware in the form of a product-by-process claim. More specifi-
cally, the enablement requirement may be met by simply disclosing
in the patent the computer program, or even the flowchart of the
program logic, and claiming the resulting programmed computer as
the hardware obtained as a result of the disclosed programming
process. This question has potentially important ramifications, be-
cause permitting a program to be patented in this way could theo-
retically expand the scope of protection from the particular object
code as stored in the memory of a particular computer, to protect
the broader underlying logical process (flowchart) that the object
code is designed to implement. That is, in addition to protecting
the object code, an inventor could conceivably foreclose others from
using the underlying logical process or computer program al-
gorithm, if using that program algorithm produces an equivalent
object code. 08
Even if no such additional protection could be obtained, draft-
106. See Note, supra note 18, at 856 n.12, for a discussion of enablement in the context of
computer programs.
107. See MPEP, § 706.03 (e).
108. A patent entitles the holder to foreclose others from making, using or selling the
patented invention or its "equivalents." See supra note 6 and accompanying text. An
"equivalent" has been defined to be subject matter which performs "substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result" as does the patented sub-
ject matter. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929).
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ing the patent as a product-by-process invention may nonetheless be
the preferred method of claiming the programmed computer. Be-
cause of the § 112 enablement requirements, it may be difficult and
lengthy to describe adequately the precise configuration of electro-
magnetic signals which particularly characterizes a computer
programmed in a specific way. Due to the complexity and level of
detail at which modem computers operate, even simple computer
programs would become extremely complex if the inventor is re-
quired to pinpoint and identify each and every memory location.
Indeed, a product-by-process claim may be the only feasible way of
accomplishing the dual interests of enablement and brevity.
3. Equivalents.
A third question is whether a programmed computer, when
viewed in this manner, would infringe upon analogous hardware or
firmware patents. For example, would a patent for a general pur-
pose computer when programmed in such a way that it receives
inputs from a numerical keyboard and performs mathematical com-
putations thereon, be considered to infringe upon a patent for a dig-
ital calculator, or even upon a mechanical adding machine? Put
another way, would a random-access memory (RAM) be equivalent
for patenting purposes to a similarly configured read-only memory
(ROM) unit. 109
Intuitively, it would seem that a programmed computer that
does precisely the same thing as a ROM chip should, at least in
some instances, not be patentable as a separate invention. For ex-
ample, coin-operated video arcade games are typically programmed
with ROMs. Permitting a competitor to then produce a home-com-
puter version of the same video game without infringing a patent on
the arcade version would seem to render that patent effectively use-
less. 110 On the other hand, it would seem equally ridiculous to in-
terpret the scope of such a patent so broadly that a general purpose
computer programmed in a particular way would be infringed by a
completely mechanical device. For example, it would push the pat-
ent laws beyond their purpose to permit a home computer tempo-
109. In this context, the term RAM, or Random Access Memory, is used to describe an
electronic memory unit which only stores its contents temporarily, automatically erasing its
contents when commanded to do so or when the computer is turned off. A ROM, or Read-
Only Memory, on the other hand, refers to a memory unit whose contents are stored perma-
nently without change.
110. In this case, production of the home-computer version may be barred under appli-
cable copyright, trademark or trade dress laws.
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rarily programmed to perform arithmetic operations to be infringed
by a digital calculator or mechanical adding machine.
These are difficult conceptual questions in themselves, and they
are beyond the scope of this article. They are raised here only to
point out the difficulties that need to be addressed before the patent-
ing of computer programs will be an effective and desirable form of
protection. In the author's view, however, as discussed above, that
these difficult questions exist is no reason in itself to completely
deny patent protection to computer programs.
IV. THE PTO's POSITION
During the 1960s-1970s, the PTO strongly opposed the patent-
ing of computer-program related inventions. Between 1969 and
1982, the C.C.P.A. reversed the PTO's denial of patent on com-
puter-program related inventions a total of eighteen times."1 '
Diamond v. Diehr apparently marked a change of heart for the
PTO. Since the Diehr decision was announced in 1982, the
C.C.P.A./C.A.F.C. reversed the PTO only four times. 12
The PTO has formally announced its new position with respect
111. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395
(C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682
(C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Knowlton,
481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Comstock, 481 F.2d 905 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re John-
ston, 502 F.2d 765 (C.C.P.A. 1974), rev'd sub nor. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976);
In re Nol, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert den., 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Chatfield, 545
F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert den., 434 U.S. 875 (1977); In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689
(C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21
(C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd sub nora. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); In re Freeman, 573
F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Johnson, 589
F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981); In re Applica-
tion of Phillips, 608 F.2d 879 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Application of Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809
(C.C.P.A. 1980), cert. den., Diamond v. Sherwood, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
The C.C.P.A. also affirmed the denial of patent for computer-program related inventions
in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A.
1979); In re Application of Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Application of
Maucorps, 609 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Application of Walter, 618 F.2d 758
(C.C.P.A. 1980).
For an excellent discussion of these cases, see Chandler, Proprietary Protection of Com-
puter Software, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 195, 230-255 (1982).
112. In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A.
1982); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
1989). The court sustained the PTO's rejections in In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A.
1982) and in In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Additionally, the PTO Board of
Appeals and Interferences affirmed the examiner's rejection in Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.
2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App. & Inter 1988), which was not appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit.
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to computer-related inventions in two published opinions.113 This
section will explore the PTO's current practice as reflected in these
published opinions and guidelines.1 14
A. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.
In 1987, the PTO issued the latest revision of its Manual of
Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP). Section 2106 of this revi-
sion, entitled "Patentable Subject Matter - Mathematical Algo-
rithms or Computer. Programs," sets forth broad guidelines by
which computer-program patent applications are to be considered.
It is interesting to note that the MPEP sharply distinguishes
between inventions involving mathematical algorithms and those
involving computer programs. The MPEP discusses Diehr, Brad-
ley, and Flook only in the context of claims which "directly or indi-
rectly recite[] a mathematical algorithm."11 The manual then
recites in separate paragraphs the procedure for "analyzing com-
puter program related claims." '116
The Manual first states broadly that "computer implemented
'processes are encompassed within 35 U.S.C. § 101 under the same
principles as other machine implemented processes, subject to judi-
cially determined exceptions... In "re Johnson.' "117 The Manual
then goes on to describe the two-prong Freeman-Walter-Abele test:
In accordance with the two-step procedure outlined above,
claims seeking coverage for a computer program would be non-
statutory... only if, when considered as a whole, they merely
recite a mathematical algorithm, or a method of calculation
which is not applied in any manner to physical elements or pro-
cess steps. 118
The manual then sets forth the hypothetical program loop described
above1 19 as the only concrete example of a "judicially determined
exception[ ] outside the mathematics area."120
113. See MPEP, § 2106; Patentable Subject Matter, 1106 Official Gazette U.S. Pat. &
Trademark Off. OG5 (1989).
114. These published opinions do not have the force of law. The author's interviews of
patent examiners, however, have indicated that these publications, coupled with the case law,
provide the primary (sometimes exclusive) guidance to examiners in their examination of
computer program-related patent applications.
115. MPEP, § 2106, at 2100-3.
116. Id. at 2100-4.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See supra, note 91 and accompanying text.
120. MPEP, supra note 112, at 2100-4.
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B. The statement of the Solicitor.
The actual guidelines presented in the MPEP are brief and pro-
vide little real guidance. The PTO provided a more detailed analy-
sis in an opinion published in 1989 and endorsed by the Solicitor. 21
The PTO again sharply distinguished between claims involving
mathematical algorithms and those involving computer
programs. 12
2
Section III of the opinion begins by attempting to define what
is meant by "computer program." "A 'process' or 'algorithm' is a
step-by-step procedure to arrive at a given result. In the patent
area, a 'computer process' or 'computer algorithm' is a process, i.e.,
a series of steps, which is performed by a computer. A '[computer]
program is a sequence of coded instructions for a digital computer.'
Benson." '123 The article then observes that
[b]oth the series of steps performed by a computer, and the
software directing those steps, have acquired the name 'computer
programs'.... What is sought to be protected by patent is the
underlying process.
124
Thus, the PTO has adopted the view that computer programs are to
be defined as the logical processes that underlie the computer code
sequences.
The PTO opinion then opens its analysis by asserting that
"[the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether computer processes
are per se statutory or nonstatutory. The decisions in Benson,
Flook, and Diehr all dealt with claims viewed as mathematical algo-
rithms." 125 The opinion describes Pardo as holding that computer
processes are statutory unless they fall within a judicially deter-
mined exception. "The major (and perhaps only) exception in the
area of computer processes is the mathematical algorithm."126 The
opinion then reasons that "[i]f a computer process claim does not
contain a mathematical algorithm in the Benson sense, the second
step of the Freeman- Walter-Abele test is not reached, and the
121. Patentable Subject Matter, supra note 112. The opinion is described as a "recent
legal analysis.., on the subject of the patentability of mathematical algorithms and computer
programs. The analysis is published for the benefit of the public." Id. at 5.
122. The analysis is presented in three sections. Section I sets forth the general require-
ments of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Section II is entitled "Mathematical Algorithms." Section III is
entitled "Computer Programs."
123. Patentable Subject Matter, supra note 112, at 10-11.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 11.
126. Id.
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claimed subject matter will usually be statutory.""12 The opinion
then goes on to cite several C.C.P.A. decisions to support its con-
clusion that such processes are patentable.
128
Finally, the PTO opinion asserts that
[a]rguably, other exceptions such as 'methods of doing business'
and 'mental steps' may be raised if a claim is not a true computer
process, but merely recites that an otherwise nonstatutory pro-
cess is performed on a computer.... These would appear to be
exceptions with very narrow application to claims which are not
limited to implementation by a machine. 129
C. Conclusions concerning the PTO's approach.
The MPEP and the Solicitor's analysis provide little real in-
sight or guidance into the PTO's practice in examining computer
program patent applications. The two publications are little more
than broad endorsements of certain C.C.P.A. decisions. Arguably,
the publications go even farther than do the cases which they
cite. 130
Though the actual approach taken by the PTO examiners in
the examination of such application may be difficult to discern from
these publications, it is clear that the PTO has broadly and whole-
heartedly embraced the position that computer programs, defined
as the underlying logical processes, are as a general rule included
within 35 U.S.C. § 101. It is interesting to note that the skilled en-
gineers and scientists in the PTO have soundly rejected the proposi-
tion that all computer programs are necessarily mathematical
algorithms. Indeed, perhaps no single fact is more clear from the
PTO's published opinions.
V. CONCLUSION
Computer programs hold a unique place in our society. It is
beyond dispute that the development of novel computer programs
has had a profound effect on technology. But because of their sui




130. The Solicitor's analysis does not even attempt a scholarly, objective examination of
the case law; instead it selectively extracts dicta which supports its ultimate conclusion of
patentability. Interestingly, the analysis cites with approval the Delaware District Court's
decision in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983), a decision which is singled out for criticism by Profes-
sor Samuelson. See Samuelson, supra note 2, at 1120-1122.
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patent laws. This is no reason, however, to deny patents where the
program is novel, useful and nonobvious. It is all too easy a solu-
tion to simply propose that computer programs should be precluded
entirely from receiving patent protection. Instead of searching for
justifications for denying such programs the benefits of patent pro-
tection, we should instead be searching for ways to incorporate
them into the patent system.

